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Why	Putin	won’t	attempt	to	‘integrate’	Estonia	and
Latvia	into	the	Russian	Federation
Following	the	Russian	annexation	of	Crimea	in	2014,	there	were	fears	that	Estonia	and	Latvia	could	be
dragged	into	a	similar	crisis	due	to	the	large	numbers	of	ethnic	Russians	living	in	each	state.	But	as
Michele	E.	Commercio	highlights,	the	unique	history	of	Estonia	and	Latvia	has	produced	a	very
different	situation	to	that	in	Ukraine,	with	both	states	now	hosting	a	new	generation	of	integrated,
bilingual	ethnic	Russians	who	are	content	with	their	lives	in	Estonia	and	Latvia.	Any	attempt	to	integrate
parts	of	Estonia	or	Latvia	into	the	Russian	Federation	would	likely	face	fierce	resistance	from	ethnic
Russians	on	the	ground	as	well	as	from	NATO	forces.
Tallinn,	Credit:	Visit	Estonia	(CC	BY-NC-SA	2.0)
Russia’s	annexation	of	Crimea	in	2014	generated	grave	concerns	in	the	international	community	regarding	Putin’s
potential	further	ambitions,	particularly	toward	the	Baltic	States.	This	apprehension	was	the	foundation	of	NATO’s
decision	to	beef	up	its	military	presence	in	Estonia,	Latvia,	and	Lithuania.	Yet	Putin	has	made	no	effort	to	‘integrate’
these	states,	or	heavily	Russified	parts	of	these	states,	into	the	Russian	Federation.	The	most	obvious	reason	for	this
is	the	fact	that	all	three	Baltic	states	are	members	of	NATO;	Ukraine,	of	course,	is	not	a	member	of	NATO.
But	there	is	another	seemingly	simple	but	significant	reason	Putin	will	not	try	to	integrate	these	states	into	the
Russian	Federation:	he	is	cognisant	of	the	fact	that	such	a	geopolitical	move	would	be	too	difficult	because	ethnic
Russians	in	Estonia,	where	they	are	25%	of	the	population,	and	Latvia,	where	they	are	26%	of	the	population,	are
content.	They	have	no	desire	to	join	the	Russian	Federation.	Indeed,	they	would	resist	an	attempt	at	integration,	and
NATO	would	support	the	territorial	integrity	of	the	sovereign	states	in	which	they	reside.
The	assertion	that	ethnic	Russians	in	Estonia	and	Latvia	are	satisfied	with	the	status	quo	requires	further
explanation.	When	Estonia	and	Latvia	became	independent	sovereign	states	in	1991,	they	embarked	on
nationalisation	projects	designed	to	strengthen	and	promote	the	Estonian	and	Latvian	nation	politically,	culturally,
demographically,	and	economically.	This	is	hardly	surprising,	given	the	traumatic	history	of	each	nation,	which	we
can	characterise	in	terms	of	deportation,	occupation,	and	illegal	annexation.
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Following	the	illegal	incorporation	of	the	Baltic	States	into	the	Soviet	Union	in	1941,	Moscow	pursued	an	aggressive
Russification	policy	that	included	outsourcing	ethnic	Russian	labour	to	these	states	to	ensure	political	stability,
cultural	conformity,	and	economic	reliability.	The	policy	resulted	in	a	demographic	imbalance	that	rendered	Estonians
and	Latvians	a	bare	majority	within	their	respective	union	republic.	It	also	generated	asymmetric	bilingualism,	as
Russians	were	monolingual	while	out	of	necessity	Estonians	and	Latvians	were	bilingual,	mastering	Russian	for
practical	purposes	while	attempting	with	difficulty	to	keep	their	native	languages	alive.
Aggressive	Russification	also	ensured	an	ethnic	Russian	or	heavily	Russified	Estonian/Latvian	political	leadership
that	advanced	Moscow’s	interests	at	the	expense	of	local	interests.	By	the	end	of	the	1980s,	Russification	policies
had	spawned	a	pervasive	fear	of	cultural	extinction	among	Estonians	and	Latvians	that	motivated	elites	to	pursue	the
most	aggressive	nationalisation	policies	implemented	in	the	post-Soviet	states.
Although	it	has	waxed	and	waned	over	time,	particularly	as	the	European	Union	pressures	member	states	to	abide
by	the	Framework	Convention	for	the	Protection	of	National	Minorities,	Estonian	and	Latvian	nationalisation	included
at	one	time	or	another,	for	example,	citizenship	laws	that	granted	automatic	citizenship	only	to	individuals	who	were
citizens	of	the	respective	interwar	republic.	Given	the	massive	influx	of	ethnic	Russians	into	the	Estonian	and	Latvian
Soviet	republics	after	WWII,	this	meant	that	most	ethnic	Russians	residing	in	independent	Estonia	and	Latvia	were
not	granted	automatic	citizenship	and	had	to	naturalise	if	they	wanted	to	belong	to	the	polity.
Naturalisation	policies	were	linked	to	cultural	preservation	attempts,	as	they	required	applicants	to	pass
Estonian/Latvian	language	tests.	Another	example	of	Estonian	and	Latvian	nationalisation	resides	in	language	policy:
Estonian	and	Latvian	are	the	state	languages	of	Estonia	and	Latvia	respectively;	all	other	languages,	including
Russian,	are	designated	foreign	languages.	In	addition,	knowledge	of	the	state	language	is	a	standard	requirement
for	public	sector	employment.
Estonian	and	Latvian	nationalisation	could	have	generated	conflict	between	ethnic	Russians	on	the	one	hand	and
Estonians	in	Estonia	and	Latvians	in	Latvia	on	the	other	hand.	But	this	has	not	happened	because	elites	in	these
countries	have	devised	what	I	call	a	system	of	partial	control,	in	which	the	majority	ethnic	group	controls	the	political
sector	but	shares	control	of	the	economic	sector	with	minority	ethnic	groups.
The	citizenship	and	language	policies	discussed	above	have,	over	time,	ensured	firm	Estonian	and	Latvian	political
control	over	independent	Estonia	and	Latvia.	Consolidation	of	political	control	has	enabled	Estonian	and	Latvian
elites	to	permit	economic	access	to	the	system	without	opposition	from	staunch	anti-Russian	Estonian	and	Latvian
nationalists.	Working	under	the	assumption	that	economic	prosperity	would	give	ethnic	Russians	a	stake	in	the
system	and	thus	discourage	conflict,	Estonian	and	Latvian	elites	opened	the	private	sector	to	Russians	after	they	had
secured	political	control.
Excluded	from	the	public	sector	in	the	1990s	and	early	2000s	as	a	result	of	citizenship	and/or	language	policy,	ethnic
Russians	established	businesses	in	Estonia	and	Latvia’s	flourishing	private	sectors.	Economic	stability,	and	in	some
cases	prosperity,	along	with	EU	and	NATO	membership,	discouraged	Russians	from	leaving	Estonia	and	Latvia	and
from	protesting	nationalisation	policies	in	these	countries.	Indeed,	it	encouraged	them	to	take	advantage	of	available
economic	opportunities,	naturalise,	and	raise	their	children	bilingually.	The	end	result	is	a	new	generation	of
integrated,	bilingual	ethnic	Russians	who	are	content	with	their	lives	in	Estonia	and	Latvia.	Were	Putin	to	unwisely
attempt	to	‘integrate’	Estonia	and	Latvia,	he	would	face	fierce	resistance	from	ethnic	Russians	on	the	ground	as	well
as	NATO	forces	there	to	defend	the	integrity	of	these	independent,	sovereign	states.
Michele	E.	Commercio	is	the	author	of	Russian	Minority	Politics	in	Post-Soviet	Latvia	and	Kyrgyzstan:	The
Transformative	Power	of	Informal	Networks
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Note:	This	article	gives	the	views	of	the	author,	not	the	position	of	EUROPP	–	European	Politics	and	Policy	or	the
London	School	of	Economics.
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